Overview: In his inaugural book “The Destroying Angel,” author Brett
Gibbons (a Captain in the US Army Reserves), argues why the Rifled-Musket of
the 1850s and 60s was the first modern infantry weapon. The weapon fundamentally
altered the capabilities and role of infantry on the battlefield. It resulted
in new tactics and theories which made the weapon more similar to firearms
today than what came before. In so doing, Gibbons challenges contemporary
historian’s (most notably Allen Guelzo and Earl Hess) who argue that the
technical limitations of the rifled-musket prevented it from having any meaningful
impacts on war and soldiers. Guelzo and Hess argue that the rifled-musket had
more in common with the smoothbore musket of Napoleon’s time, than the weapons
which came later. Gibbons takes the opposite stance. Gibbons argues, the brief
rifled-musket era (about 15-20 years) represented a fundamental shift in both
the capabilities of the standard infantry’s small arms weapon, and also the
requirements placed upon the ordinary soldier. Gibbons argues the rifled-musket
necessitated the adoption of a professional, thinking, soldier rather than the
drilled, automatons, of the Napoleonic era.
To make his case, Gibbons first looks at the clearest
example of how the rifled-musket changed warfare, the Crimean War. The Crimean
War was fought from 1853-1856, between the British/French/Ottoman alliance and
the Russian Empire. At this time, the rifled-musket was just beginning to
become the standard issue weapon in the British Army. The Crimean War is ripe with
examples of how the rifle was changing warfare and Gibbons details multiple
examples to support this argument. Gibbons
reveals individual marksmen knocking out artillery batteries at ranges in
excess of 500 yards (a previously unprecedented occurrence), breaking up columns
of Russian infantry hundreds of yards before the smoothbore armed Russians
could bring their Napoleonic weapons into range, and shattering cavalry charges
with multiple volleys of accurate fire, long before the cavalry could close to
charge the infantry (previously infantry firing at cavalry in line was a
sitting duck).
After these obvious and powerful examples, Gibbons talks
about the weapon itself (what was the rifled-musket and how was it different?),
the weapons iconic parabolic trajectory, which it’s critics claim were an Achilles
heel of the weapon, but how despite these limitations the weapon resulted in a
revolution in military theory. Gibbons talks how the high arching trajectory of
a rifled-musket’s shot actually resulted in the development of modern infantry
tactics. This trajectory allowed the invention of infantry being used as
support troops for assaulting infantry. Support troops would fire over the head
of advancing infantry, to pin down the defender while, the assaulting column advanced
in relative safety. Cover/Support fire is a tactic which is fundamental to the
modern way of war even today (150 years later). Gibbons also talks about how
the British trained soldiers to use their weapons in a highly professional
manner. This was a revolution in of itself. Prior to the rifled musket,
infantry was just a trigger puller. Smoothbore-musket armed soldiers just needed
to point their weapon in the general direction of the enemy, pull the trigger,
and reload. The rifled-musket armed soldier needed to be an individual soldier.
He needed to know how to estimate distance, adjust his sites for the distance,
and aim deliberately. These new requirements prompted the British army to open
up marksmanship schools, something previously unheard of but something which
remains an essential today. Gibbons then returns to the battlefield with
additional examples of rifled-muskets being used as modern fire arms (during
the Indian Rebellion of 1857) and of other nations failing to use the weapons
as anything but a modified smoothbore-musket (the wars of Italian Unification).
He discusses how different powers either successfully or unsuccessfully leveraged
the capabilities of the new weapons (namely the British vs the French) and he
concludes with a brief look at the American Civil War and the contemporary
historian’s arguments.
In his final passages, Gibbons challenges the arguments of
contemporary historians, Guelzo and Hess. Gibbons argues that both historians
make the mistake of relying too heavily on the American Civil War in their
evaluation of the rifled-musket. Gibbons’ thesis that the rifled-musket was the
first modern infantry weapon also means it’s the first firearm which requires a
modern soldier. During the American Civil War, while US soldiers were impeccably
drilled in the maneuvers of Napoleonic armies, they received little to no marksmanship
training. Modern fire arms require substantial and constant live fire training
to make an infantryman effective. During the Civil War marksmanship training
was nearly unheard of. Because of the lack of training and the failure of the
US officer corps to adapt to a new way of thinking about their weapons, the American’s
failed to leverage the new capabilities of their rifled-muskets, despite having
hundreds of thousands of soldiers armed with them. Gibbons claims, Gulezo and
Hess fail to understand the way in which the rifled-musket was revolutionary because
they failed to look at the right conflicts. The British Army of the 1850s and
1860s is where Gibbons argues the rifled-musket was truly appreciated and where
its full potential was leveraged. After all, you can’t have a modern fire arm,
if you don’t also have a soldier trained to use it. The British backed up their
breakthrough weapons with revolutionary training regimes worthy of a modern
army. Guelzo and Hess are mistaken because the American armies they looked at
were not training their soldiers to be modern soldiers; they were training them
to march in the ranks of Napoleon or Wellington. American soldiers had neither
the time nor the resources to do anything different.
Conclusion:
For a first book, Gibbons’ “The Destroying Angel”
is impressive. Gibbons clearly has a knack for clear and precise prose. He effectively
and succinctly lays out his argument and explains things like firing arc’s and
trajectories in a way which the ordinary reader can easily follow. He also
provides several graphics which help the more visually inclined (the Kindle
version’s visuals are far superior to the print version of the book). Gibbons
key failings are unusual for an author, he’s too concise. The book while
approachable and an easy read (100 pages in the print version) also lacks
somewhat for contextual depth. Gibbons provides the necessary context for the
rifled-musket itself but his case studies could have used more depth. There seems
to be an expectation that the reader already has a background in history and at
least a 10,000 foot understanding of the Crimean War or the Wars of Italian
Unification. While the lack of context doesn’t take away from the argument, it
may prove somewhat incomplete to the reader looking to understand why the Italian
soldiers were not professionals like the British. Additionally, Gibbons focuses
heavily on the British Army and their use of the rifled-musket but the book
would benefit at looking at how the Prussian’s, Italians, and Austrian’s viewed
this new technology. There is perhaps too much of a focus on the British,
without enough context of the outside world (it’s there, just not in much
detail). Additionally, a more detailed background of the development of the
first rifles and how the rifled-musket was different (the book touches lightly
upon this) would also be appreciated. Still, these are minor complaints, borne
mainly out of my desire to read more by Gibbons. On the whole, I fully enjoyed
this book and for $4.99 (Kindle Price) I can’t recommend this book enough (affordable,
approachable, and well written), for anyone remotely interested in the topic.
If this sounds like something you might want to read you can buy the book here:
